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Abstract
Privacy consideration in health data usually prevents researchers and other data
users from conducting their research. Also, data is distributed through various health
organizations such as hospitals, thus gathering distributed health information be-
comes impractical. Various approaches have been proposed to preserve the patients
privacy, whilst allowing researchers to perform mathematical operations and statisti-
cal analysis methods on health data, such as anonymization and secure computation.
Data anonymization reduces the accuracy of the original data; hence the final re-
sult would not be precise enough. In addition, there are several known attacks on
anonymized data, such as using public information and background knowledge to
re-identify the original data. On the other hand, secure computation is more precise
and the risk of data re-identification is zero; however, it is computationally less effi-
cient than data anonymization. In this thesis, we implemented a web-based secure
computation framework and propose new secure statistical analysis methods. Using
the proposed web application, researchers and other data users would be able to per-
form popular statistical analysis methods on distributed data. They will be able to
perform mathematical operations and statistical analysis methods as queries through
different data owners, and receive the final result without revealing any sensitive in-
formation. Digital Epidemiology Chronic Disease Tool (DEPICT) database, which
contains real patients information, will be used to demonstrate the applicability of
the web application.
Keywords Secure Multiparty Computation; Web-Based Framework, Privacy-
Preserving; Homomorphic Encryption, Secure Statistical Analysis Methods
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Preserving the security and privacy of health information plays an important role in
the modern era. Technology grows every day and the need to protect confidential
data has become essential. At the same time, researchers and scientists should be
able to access these data for research purposes, to execute mathematical operations or
statistical analysis methods on data. For many years, researchers had to physically
go to health data centers in order to conduct their research. This is still a com-
mon practice; however, two settings introduced for privacy-preserving have brought
more options to make this process easier. The first approach is anonymization and
randomization such as generalization, suppression, and random sampling, and the
second one is secure (multi-party) computation. There are various approaches for
data anonymization such as optimal k-anonymization [7] and fast data anonymiza-
tion [27]. When anonymization is used, no confidential data is revealed and statistical
methods can be executed. The results taken from de-identified data are not precise
enough when privacy is in high concern, thus using another approach seems essential.
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Secure computation leads to more precise and secure results; therefore, researchers
would be able to perform their own statistical methods on the data without revealing
any confidential information. The risk of re-identification is close to zero, but it could
be computationally prohibitive comparing to performing statistical analysis methods
on anonymized data.
Andrew Yao [64] introduced the concept of secure computation in 1982. The idea
was to perform a function on two parties’ private data, and only return the result
to each party (or a third party) without revealing any other information from one
to the other. Not long after, Yao’s approach was generalized by Goldreich, Micali
and Wigderson for multiple parties [29]. This means that instead of only two parties,
more than two parties (n where n ≥ 3) parties can participate.
Secure computation guarantees that no sensitive information would be revealed, but
allows the end-users to perform a function on their private data. Secure computation
can be done using various approaches, and several implementations of secure com-
putations have been proposed and developed in recent years [37, 5]. Also, various
privacy-preserving protocols with diverse functionalities have been built based on the
above approaches. In addition, cryptography techniques, such as homomorphic en-
cryption, could be used for secure computation. There are two types of homomorphic
encryption systems; partially homomorphic cryptosystems such as Paillier [46], Elga-
mal [22], and RSA [48], and fully homomorphic encryption systems such as the work
proposed by Gentry [26].
Ideally, any mathematical operation can be performed on encrypted data using fully
homomorphic cryptosystems. Gentry [26] proposed the most popular fully homo-
morphic encryption system in 2009. The performance of the proposed cryptosystem
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does not live up to other cryptosystems, which makes it impractical for long mes-
sages. However, not all mathematical operations can be performed using partially
homomorphic encryption systems. Gentry [26] scheme supports both addition and
multiplication operations and is based on somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme.
This is still impractical when the security level increases. Cramer et al. [14] scheme
is based on homomorphic threshold cryptosystem, which can be used for multi-party
computation, but there is an issue with their approach. Long messages cannot be
split, because the chosen ciphertext property is not preserved in this way. Domingo
Ferrer [18] proposed another homomorphic encryption scheme, but the ciphertext
message space is too large and is impractical for long messages. Although fully homo-
morphic encryption systems are making huge improvements for secure computation,
no practical approach has been proposed yet. When dealing with sensitive data such
as health information, there are many factors to consider other than the security of
the system such as the usage and disclosure of personal health information.
Personal health information is a sensitive type of personal information that can be
shared for multiple purposes such as research, treatment and care. The collection, use
and disclosure of personal health information has been addressed by different privacy
acts such as Personal Health Information Act (PHIA) and Personal Health Informa-
tion Protection Act (PHIPA). These acts consists of sets of rules in which all data
custodians, individuals, agents, and health organizations should follow. Every person
who delivers healthcare services or product should follow defined rules. There exists
seven categories in the definition. Under this act, each individual or organization that
provides technology to a data custodian, must follow the restrictions on how to use
and disclose personal health information. Also, all individuals or organizations that
3
are the recipient of personal health information, must follow the act. The act pro-
tects personal health information in oral or written form that are related to a person’s
physical or mental health, identification, payment related to healthcare and other in-
formation that are related to an individual’s information. These rules restrict and
prevent health organizations to share their information for research purposes. Also,
health organizations usually resist on sharing information for security and beneficial
reasons, but they are willing to provide secure services in order to get an aggregated
result.
A practical and secure solution has been introduced by Samet et al. [51], in which
data owners could securely and jointly perform a privacy-preserving protocol by only
exchanging encrypted values between themselves. At the end, each of them will send
their portion of the final results to the researcher to combine the received shares and
construct the final results of their query. In this thesis, we focus on implementing a
web-based framework based on various works done by Samet such as [52, 53, 50, 51],
which can be improved by adding more statistical analysis methods modified for
multi-party computation. Various features have been added to this framework, such
as including an authorized server for user access control or system parameterization.
The outline of this thesis is as follow: Chapter 2 covers basic definitions and pre-
liminaries. In Chapter 3, we review background and related work. The proposed
approach, research methods and various aspects of the system such as configurations
are discussed in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, we thoroughly explain the implementation
of the web-based framework, system parameters, and features. Experimental results
will be covered and shown in Chapter 6, followed by conclusions and future work in
Chapter 7.
4
Chapter 2
Preliminaries and Definitions
In this chapter, we will describe the terminologies, techniques, and concepts used in
our system to make sure that reader will have basic understanding of our system
design.
2.1 Statistical Analysis Methods
Statistical analysis is the science of collecting, interpreting and presenting large
amount of data to find out about the existing patterns and trends. Statistical anal-
ysis is fundamental to all researches that use statistics as a methodology. In social
sciences, engineering, healthcare and many other fields, statistics are applied every
day. There exists various statistical analysis methods such as arithmetic mean, vari-
ance, standard deviation, student’s t-test, linear regression and logistic regression.
Therefore, each can be used to interpret data in a unique way. Some of statistical
analysis methods are as below:
5
1. Mean: The arithmetic mean is an average score which is the sum of individual
scores divided by the number of those individuals. If our sample data consists
of values x1, x2, · · · , xn, mean (denoted by x¯) is as below:
x¯ =
(x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xn)
n
(2.1)
2. Standard Deviation [9]: Standard deviation is to measure the dispersion or
deviation of a set of data from its mean and is a measure of the spread of
scores. To calculate standard deviation, variance has to be calculated first and
the square root of variance is standard deviation. Variance is also a method to
measure the spread between numbers in a data set. To calculate the variance,
the differences between each number in the data set and the mean is measured
and squared. Then the summation of these values is calculated and divided
by the number of the values in the set. If our sample data consists of values
x1, x2, · · · , xn, variance (denoted by σ2) is as below:
σ2 =
n∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)2
n
(2.2)
Thus, standard deviation (denoted by σ) is:
σ =
√
σ2 =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)2
n
(2.3)
3. Skewness [41]: When the normal distribution of a set of data is measured, the
distribution might have fewer data on the right or the left, which is said that the
distribution is skewed to the right or left respectively. Skewness is a method to
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calculate the asymmetry of a set of data in normal distribution. If our sample
data consists of values x1, x2, · · · , xn, skewness (denoted by γ) is as below:
γ =
n∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)3
nσ3
(2.4)
4. Correlation [24]: Correlation is a statistical method to measure how strong
two sets of variables are linked. Also, it can be used to measure the movement
(increase or decrease) of the second variable when the first variable moves.
Correlation ranges between −1 and +1. When correlation is positive, it can be
implied that the sets of variables move in the same direction (increase or decrease
together). Also, when correlation is negative, it shows that the variables move in
the opposite direction (when one increases, the other decreases). If our sample
data consists of values x1, x2, · · · , xn for the first variable and y1, y2, · · · , yn for
the second variable, correlation (denoted by ρ) is as below:
ρ =
(
n∑
i=1
xi ∗ yi)− n ∗ x¯ ∗ y¯
n ∗ σx ∗ σy (2.5)
5. Chi-Square Test [40]: Chi-Square is a test to compare the observed data with
the expected result according to a hypothesis. Also, it can be used to view the
distribution differences between categorical variables. Thus, the variables’ types
should be categorical such as ”yes” and ”no” or ”0” and ”1”. For simplicity of
the mentioned method, we imagine a 2x2 contingency table for two categorical
variables and two data types. The contingency table is shown in Table 1.
For the 2x2 contingency table shown in Table 1, Chi-Square (denoted by χ2)
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Variables Data Type 1 Data Type 2
Category 1 x1 x2
Category 2 x3 x4
Table 1: 2x2 Contingency Table
is as below:
χ2 =
(x1 ∗ x4 − x2 ∗ x3)2 ∗ (x1 ∗ x2 ∗ x3 ∗ x4)
(x1 + x2) ∗ (x3 + x4) ∗ (x2 + x4) ∗ (x1 + x3) (2.6)
When χ2 is close to zero, we denote that there is no significant difference between
the observed result and the expected result.
6. Student’s t-test [56]: A t-test is an examination of two samples’ means. In
students t-test, both samples should follow the normal distribution if the null
hypothesis is true and examines the difference between two samples. It is mostly
used when there are two variables and one of them is a measurement variable
and the other is a categorical variable. For a sample of size n with mean value
of x¯1 and standard deviation σ drawn from a random population with mean
value of x¯2 and unknown standard deviation, Student’s t-test (denoted by t) is
as below:
t =
x¯1 − x¯2
σ/√n
(2.7)
In student’s t-test, the degree of approximation depends on parent’s population
closeness to normal distribution and also on the sample size.
7. Linear Regression [45]: Linear regression is a predictive analysis to model the
relationship between two variables where one variable is a dependent variable
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and the other variable is independent. Linear regression finds a linear function
that fits a given set of data points in the dataset that best describes the bivariate
data. If X is the independent variable and Y is the dependant variable, a linear
regression line equation is as below:
Y = a+ bX (2.8)
where a is a constant value when x = 0 and b is the regression coefficient. When
x is the value of an independent variable, the predicted value (denoted by yˆ) is
as below:
yˆ = a+ bx (2.9)
a and b are calculated as below:
b =
n∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)(yi − y¯)
n∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)2
(2.10)
a = y¯ − b ∗ x¯ (2.11)
8. Logistic Regression [33]: Logistic regression is a statistical method to model
the relationship between one dependant variable which is dichotomous and one
or more independent variable(s). Logistic regression can be described as a
special case for generalized linear model which is based on different assumptions
than linear regression. Unlike linear regression that is used for both continuous
or categorical variables, logistic regression is used for binary dependent variables
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2.2 Statistical Analysis Methods on Health Re-
search
Statistical methods have plenty of utilizations such as healthcare resources and cost
analysis [43], quality improvement [23], health assessment [6] and many other applica-
tions. As an example, we can simplify the outpatient clinic problem discussed in [23].
The management of an outpatient clinic was notified that the average time between
the patient arrival and the blood test or electrocardiogram (ECG) of the patient is
around 30 minutes. The management decided to monitor the average waiting time of
patients in each day of the week for several weeks. Afterwards, the mean and standard
deviation of the waiting time was calculated for each day of the week. By comparing
the calculated values for each day, they found out that the average waiting time of
the patients on Friday is a lot more than the other days. Thus, they monitor the
patients on Friday and found out that the there are more ECG patients on Fridays
than blood test patients comparing other days of the week. ECG patients require
more examination time than blood test patients. Thus, the average waiting time
on Fridays was significantly more than the other days. Based on the given analysis,
the management decided to dedicate more doctors and nurses on Fridays for ECG
patients and as a result the average waiting time of patients reduced to 15 minutes.
More real life examples can be found at Section 4.5.
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2.3 Homomorphic Encryption
In algebra, homomorphism is a map between two groups respecting the structure of
each group. A group is a set that includes a law and an operation (4). Assuming we
have two groups such as (G,4) and (H, ◦) where 4 and ◦ represent operations on
set G and H respectively, a group homomorphism from G to H is defined as below:
f(a4b) = f(a) ◦ f(b),
where f is a function from G to H for all a and b in G. Homomorphic encryption is
a type of encryption that allows specific types of computations on the plaintext to
be carried on the ciphertext. If we assume that the plaintexts and ciphertexts create
two homomorphism groups such as (P,4) and (C, ◦) respectively, we have:
E(a)4E(b) = E(a ◦ b), for all a and b in P (2.12)
It also allows computations to be performed on encrypted data without revealing
confidential information about the original data. However, if the private key gets
compromised, data can be leaked by decrypting the encrypted values. There are two
types of Homomorphic Encryption systems: Fully Homomorphic and Partially Ho-
momorphic cryptosystems. A cryptosystem is called a fully homomorphic encryption
system if it supports arbitrary number of operations such as multiplication and ad-
dition to implement any functions that are needed. Gentry cryptosystem [26] is the
first practical fully homomorphic cryptosystem which supports both multiplication
and addition. Partially homomorphic cryptosystems only support one operation such
as addition or multiplication. There are several partially homomorphic cryptosys-
tems such as El-Gamal cryptosystem [22] which supports multiplication or Paillier
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cryptosystem [46] which supports addition. In addition, there exist somewhat ho-
momorphic encryption systems. These cryptosystems support a limited number of
operations. Fully homomorphic cryptosystems such as Gentry cryptosystem [26] have
tremendous overhead and other approaches are not practical. Thus, somewhat fully
homomorphic encryption systems such as Brakerski’s scheme [11] which is based on
the ring learning with errors assumption could be used for most of the problems
that do not need an arbitrary number of computations. Many works have been done
in somewhat fully homomorphic encryption field for secure multi-party computation
such as Damgard et al. [15] multi-party computation from somewhat homomorphic
encryption and Boneh et al. [10] private database queries using somewhat homo-
morphic encryption. Most of the mentioned encryption systems are not practical or
secure enough for multi-party computations. Also, the encrypted data is a pair of
numbers which makes fully homomorphic encryption systems more complicated and
impractical to use. Paillier cryptosystem is secure against chosen plaintext attack.
Also, Paillier encryption uses randomness in its encryption method which produces
different ciphertexts for the same plaintext. Because Paillier is an additive homomor-
phic encryption system, we are unable to implement most of the statistical analysis
methods. Thus, we use method proposed in [53] for secure multiplication and the
method of [28] for secure dot product to empower Paillier cryptosystem with various
mathematical operations.
12
2.4 Paillier Cryptosystem
Paillier cryptosystem named after Pascal Paillier is a modular public key scheme
which is also an additive homomorphic cryptosystem. Like any other public key
scheme, it has its own key generation phase, encryption phase using public keys and
decryption phase using private keys. Key generation is as follow:
1. To construct public keys, two randomly generated large prime numbers p, q are
needed. For simplicity, these two numbers can have equal length.
2. Then we calculate their product such that:
n = p ∗ q (2.13)
3. We also calculate the least common multiple of p− 1 and q − 1 such that:
λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1) (2.14)
4. A random integer g should be selected from Zn2 . To ensure that g is divisible
by n, the relationship described by the below equation should hold between the
chosen and used variables:
µ = (L(gλ mod n2))−1(mod n) (2.15)
where L is a function such that:
L(u) =
u− 1
n
(2.16)
5. The public keys are n and g.
6. The private keys are µ and λ.
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After generating public keys and private keys, we will be able to encrypt and decrypt
a message and ciphertext respectively. The encryption process is as follow:
1. We choose message m from Zn.
2. Then we select a random number r from Z∗n (Z
∗
n being the invertible elements
of Zn).
3. Encrypting a message is as follow:
c = E(m) = gm ∗ rn (mod n2) (2.17)
The decryption process would be as follow:
1. We assume that ciphertext c is from Z∗n2 and previously created by the cryp-
tosystem (it ensures us that c is invertible in Z∗n2).
2. Decrypting the ciphertext is as follow:
m = D(c) = L(cλ mod n2) ∗ µ (mod n2) (2.18)
Here is an example of Paillier Cryptosystem. For ease of calculations, small prime
numbers will be chosen for this purpose. Suppose we choose p = 13 and q = 11 for
our prime numbers. Thus, n = 13 ∗ 11 = 143. Furthermore, we have to choose a
random g and calculate λ and µ as below:
g = 67, λ = lcm(12, 10) = 60, µ = (L(6760 mod 20449))−1 mod 143 = 124 (2.19)
For example, we want to encrypt 7 as our message. First we have to select a random
number and then encrypt the message as below:
r = 5 => c = E(7) = 677 ∗ 5143 mod 20449 = 14271 (2.20)
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Now we want to decrypt a ciphertext such as 14271. The process is as below:
m = D(14271) = L(1427160 mod 20449) ∗ 124 mod 143 = 7 (2.21)
15
Chapter 3
Related Work
Many privacy-preserving techniques tend to transform information in order to pre-
serve privacy. These methods reduce the accuracy of the data and cause information
loss. Randomization and anonymization are some examples of transformation meth-
ods. Randomization is done by adding noise components to the original data in a
way that the variance of the added noise is large enough. By adding noise, original
data cannot be derived from distorted data. Randomization has been used for data
distortion and found its way to privacy preserving in data mining [5]. Noise can be
added to the values in database such as the method proposed by Traub and Yem-
ini [58] in a way that each vector in database is replaced by another vector which
creates a random perturbated vector. Also, noise can be added to the final result
of the query such as the method proposed by Beck [8]. Although randomization is
relatively simple and no knowledge is needed for the distribution of data, it is more
vulnerable to adversarial attacks [2]. More noise should be added to the original data
in order to provide more security using randomization. As a result, it reduces the
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accuracy of the data for data mining purposes. In the past, many data owners cre-
ated statistical databases using randomization techniques for research purposes [63].
However, creating statistical databases became time consuming and costly due to
tremendous increase in demand for person-specific data for various applications such
as data mining and fraud detection. Moreover, adding noise to these databases for
preserving the privacy led to inaccurate results.
Data anonymization is the process of de-identifying sensitive data in order to pro-
tect data without any change to the data type. One of the popular techniques for
anonymization is inference in multi-level databases [44]. In multi-level database, the
data is restricted in a way that only lower classified information will be released in
a way that higher classified information could not be revealed. In a more advance
approach which was proposed by Denning and Lunt [17], multiple security classifica-
tions could be defined for multiple types of users and multilevel databases could be
created for each security classification.
In 1999, Agrawal [4] mentioned that an important field of future research could be
the development of techniques to overcome privacy concern. In 2000, Agrawal and
Srikant [5] proposed a method for privacy preserving in the data mining field. The
idea was to let users provide a value for sensitive fields using Value-Class Member-
ship method or Value Distortion method and reconstructing the original distribution.
In their method, the values for an attribute are classified into different groups in a
way that they are mutually exclusive. So, by using discretization some intervals are
created where each value can be stored in a specific interval. In this way, true value
does not have to be stored in the database. For example, age may be discretized into
five different intervals such as less than 18, between 18 and 30, between 30 and 50
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and more than 50. By using this discretization, true values for each attribute will
be hidden. Also, values can be distorted instead of being classified. A truly random
number will be added to each value in order to prevent snoopers from estimating
the true value through multiple queries. The random value can be generated using
Uniform Distribution or Gaussian Distribution. It has been shown that discretiza-
tion is less efficient than distribution [5]. In order to have the same level of privacy
using discretization comparing to uniform distribution, interval width should be in-
creased significantly which results in inaccurate model. Also, it has been shown that
the Gaussian distribution provides more privacy at higher confidence level compared
to uniform distribution [5]. Thus, the Gaussian distribution has been used in their
approach. In this system, the original distribution should be reconstructed in order
to be useful. The original data distribution can be reconstructed using decision tree
classification over randomized data as shown in [5].
In modern era, data is distributed through various data owners and also there is re-
dundancy between many data owners, thus data owners have incomplete knowledge
over one another. As a result, releasing information without proper knowledge of
other released data may cause revealing sensitive information. Also, suppression is
used for designing multilevel databases which can reduce the quality of the final re-
sult.
Another technique for data anonymization is k-anonymity, which was introduced by
Sweeney [57] in 2002. K-anonymity would guarantee that each record of a data table
is similar to at least k-1 other records on the data table (in terms of Quasi-identifiers).
An example of k-anonymity is shown in Figure 1. There are two common methods
for k-anonymity; suppression and generalization. In suppression, the values of a spe-
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cific attribute will be removed completely. In generalization, the values of a specific
attribute are generalized to a range. K-anonymity reduces the risk of information
Id Postal Code Age Nationality Condition Id Postal Code Age Nationality Condition
1 A1A 3K8 22 Canadian Heart Disease 1 A1A *** <30 * Heart Disease
2 A1A 2B7 27 Iranian Cancer 2 A1A *** <30 * Cancer
3 A1A 6K9 23 American Cancer 3 A1A *** <30 * Cancer
4 A1B 2C4 45 Japanese Alzheimer's 4 A1B *** ≥40 * Alzheimer's
5 A1B 4B5 64 Chinese Heart Disease 5 A1B *** ≥40 * Heart Disease
6 A1B 1C8 42 Iranian Alzheimer's 6 A1B *** ≥40 * Alzheimer's
7 A1B 4K5 40 Canadian Cancer 7 A1B *** ≥40 * Cancer
8 A1C 2S6 33 Russian Heart Disease 8 A1C *** 3* * Heart Disease
9 A1C 5B5 38 Chonese Cancer 9 A1C *** 3* * Cancer
Figure 1: k-anonymity example
identification, but it also reduces the accuracy of the results on the applications
based on the mentioned methods. Although it has been shown that k-anonymity is
NP-hard [42], there are some heuristic methods to solve the problem such as Bayardo
and Agrawal k-optimize algorithm [7]. K-anonymity does not include any random-
ness, so attackers are able to extract individual and sensitive information by using
inference attacks. K-anonymity is not secure against various attacks such as Homo-
geneity Attack and Background Knowledge Attack. Also, k-anonymity should not be
used for high dimensional datasets [1]. There are some partial solutions such as I-
diversity. When I-diversity is used, the granularity of a data set is reduced. I-diversity
maintains the diversity of sensitive fields especially when the sensitive values within a
group exhibit homogeneity. It has been shown that I-diversity is secure against back-
ground knowledge attacks and homogeneity attacks [38]. Attribute values might be
skewed in a dataset, thus there might not be a feasible representation for I-diversity.
T-closeness [36] is another solution to overcome issues with k-anonymity. T-closeness
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is a refinement on I-diversity by treating each value of an attribute separately and is
based on the distribution of values for each attribute. Both I-diversity and T-closeness
reduce the utilization of the data.
There are many ways to anonymize data, so data might not be anonymized in a similar
way between various data owners (i.e. hospitals). In many cases, data is distributed
through different data owners and the privacy of the data should be preserved at the
same time. Distributed privacy preservation tends to securely distribute data through
various parties. In many cases, multiple data owners tend to derive an aggregated
result, which is partitioned through all other data owners. Each data owner may not
want to share their own information with other parties; however, they want to perform
a function such as a statistical method through the entire information and between
all the parties [3]. Distributed privacy preservation is closely related to the secure
computation field in cryptography. Pinkas discusses the intersection between privacy
preservation in data mining and secure computation using cryptography in [47].
Yao [64] introduced secure computation for two parties, which is based on represent-
ing the secure function as a Boolean circuit. At first Yao introduced a solution to
the Millionaires’ Problem. The Millionaires’ problem is as follows. Suppose Alice
and Bob are two millionaires who want to decide which one is richer than the other
without revealing their capitals to each other. Alice and Bob have i million and j
million dollars, respectively where 0 < i, j < m for definiteness where m is based
on the memory limitation of the machine used for the computation. The solution
proposed by Yao is as follows:
1. Alice establishes a public key cryptosystem where the public key is chosen ran-
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domly from N -bit nonnegative integers and sends the public key to Bob.
2. Bob creates a random integer x and encrypts this value using Alice’s public key
k = E(x). Bob computes v = k − j + 1 and sends the result to Alice.
3. Alice computes the values of Yu = D(k − j + u) for all 1 ≤ u ≤ 10.
4. Alice generates a random prime integer p where p has N/2 bits and computes
Zu = Yu mod p for all 1 ≤ u ≤ 10.
5. If all the values of Zu differ by at least 2, then we go to Step 6. Otherwise Alice
generates another random and repeats all stages.
6. Alice sends p and Z1, Z2, · · · , Zi followed by Zi+1, Zi+1+1, Zi+2+1, · · · , Z10+1
to Bob.
7. Bob computes t = x mod p. If the j-th number is equal to t, then i ≥ j,
otherwise i < j.
Yao introduced a model for the general problem based on the above approach [64].
The proposed approach was efficient enough for medium sized circuits, but a prob-
lem exists for large datasets, because there are some functions which could not be
represented as small circuits. For example, two parties want to perform a kth-ranked
element function on their dataset such as median, which includes large sets of unique
items. The rank depends on the size of the datasets. The size of a circuit for com-
puting the kth-ranked element would be linear in a best case scenario, which might
be extremely large. Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson [29] generalized Yao’s approach
for multiple parties for semi-honest adversaries and then proposed a general compiler
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from semi-honest to malicious. The problem with this approach was weak perfor-
mance. For every multiplication gate, an oblivious transfer (a protocol in which
the sender only sends a part of the information to the receiver and the receiver has
no knowledge about what part has been sent to them) should have been run by
the system. It also needs a communication round between all the parties for every
multiplication gate. However, there was not much research completed in secure com-
putation field until 2000.
Lindell and Pinkas [37] proposed a method to run a data mining algorithm on
databases of two parties without revealing any confidential and unnecessary informa-
tion, which was more efficient than generic protocols. In their work, they proposed a
privacy-preserving protocol for ID3, a well-known algorithm of decision tree learning.
As we discussed before, because of the lack of accuracy and security, anonymization
and randomization could not be reliable when precise results are needed. As a result,
much research has been done in secure computation field using cryptographic algo-
rithms to generate a final result which is more precise and secure. However, many
of the proposed methods suffer from a lack of efficiency. Cryptographic techniques
are mainly used in secure computation when the data is distributed among different
parties who want to perform a function securely using their private inputs. To achieve
an ideal secure computation method using cryptographic algorithms, secure building
blocks are needed to perform complex statistical analysis methods. Building blocks
such as multiplication and summation are needed for different steps of statistical
methods. Secure sum and secure multiplication are the two main important building
blocks for secure computation of statistical analysis methods, although they are not
the only ones. Secure comparison, secure dot product and secure count are some
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other examples of secure building blocks. Clifton [13] proposed a simple and efficient
method in which all parties were able to perform summation between their private
data without disclosing it to others. In this protocol, one party initiates the process.
The initiator generates a random number R and adds it to her private number N1
to set a new number (S1 = N1 + R) which is sent to the second party. Second party
adds her own private value to S1 (S2 = N2 +S1) and sends it to the third party. This
procedure will be repeated until the sum Sn is received by the initiator. The initiator
deducts the random number from Sn to calculate the actual sum value of the data
and broadcast it to the other parties. There are some security vulnerabilities on this
secure sum protocol. Two parties can compromise and reveal another party’s private
number (e.g. second and forth parties compromise to reveal third party’s private
number). Also, a malicious party can share an incorrect value, and as a result none
of the parties will receive the correct value except for the malicious party. These is-
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Step 5
S4=24+2=26
Step 4
Re
su
lt=
26
-7
=1
9
8 3 6 2 
R=7 
S1=8+7=15 S2=15+3=18 S3=18+6=24 
Figure 2: Clifton secure sum protocol
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sues have been solved by other researchers such as Karr [34], though the new method
uses a centralized server, which is a bottleneck for the system. Chaum et al. [12]
proposed multiple secure protocols such as multiplication and enhanced by many
other researchers. As mentioned before, we mainly follow the proposed approaches
by Samet such as [52, 53, 50, 51] which includes various secure computation protocols
on horizontally and vertically partitioned data.
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Chapter 4
Proposed Approach
To this chapter, we will discuss proposed approach to enhance security and privacy
in multi-party computation.
4.1 Data Distribution
Most of the time, data is distributed among different data custodians such as hospi-
tals. Because of security and privacy concerns, data custodians will not allow data
users (researchers) to execute a query on their databases directly. However, they are
willing to perform statistical methods without revealing their private information. As
shown in Figure 3, data custodians are willing to collaborate using privacy-preserving
distributed algorithms to perform such methods. Therefore, secure computation is
needed for running a statistical method on all records. For example, each hospital
in St. John’s has a number of patients, and assume that a data user wants to run a
statistical method through all hospitals in St. John’s. It would be the same as a data
custodian distributes data through various hospitals. From this point, we refer to
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above distribution as Subset Data Distribution. The second type of distribution
id Age No. Visits id Age No. Visits id Age No. Visits
1 25 10 1 55 19 1 43 25
2 23 20 2 32 11 2 19 7
3 40 18 3 60 5 3 25 8
4 18 27 4 29 8
5 52 14
Patients Patients Patients 
Privacy-
Preserving 
Privacy-Preserving 
Algorithms 
Privacy-Preserving 
Algorithms 
Aggregated Result 
Figure 3: subset data distribution
is a more complex process, and is used when the data custodians tend to store their
data in various data storages without revealing any information. As shown in Figure
4, each data value has been broken into n parts in a way that the summation of all
broken parts form the original data, where n is the number of data storages. For
example, imagine a data custodian wants to distribute the value of a specific column
such as Age of a specific patient whose age is 31 through three different data stor-
ages. Data custodian breaks 31 to three different segments such as 10, 15, and 6, and
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distributes these values to data storages. It can be easily seen that the summation
of three values (10, 15 and 6) is equal to the original value (31). Data is distributed
between data storages in a way that none of them have any knowledge over the orig-
inal data. From this point, we refer to above distribution type as Partial Data
Distribution. In subset data distribution, data may be distributed through many
hospitals and through various networks, which would result in loss of performance.
In partial data distribution, there is a chance of compromise between data storages
to reach the exact value of private information. There exists another type of data
id Age Bill Amount id Age Bill Amount id Age Bill Amount
1 25 50000 1 10 20000 1 15 30000
2 23 60000 2 11 18000 2 12 42000
3 40 80000 3 8 40000 3 32 40000
4 18 25000 4 5 4000 4 13 21000
5 55 100000 5 35 30000 5 20 70000
6 32 52000 6 18 10000 6 14 42000
7 60 65000 7 10 17000 7 50 48000
8 29 45000 8 15 18000 8 14 27000
9 52 50000 9 13 22000 9 39 28000
10 43 78000 10 12 11000 10 31 67000
11 19 30000 11 10 13000 11 9 17000
12 25 40000 12 7 15000 12 18 25000
Data Owner 2Data Custodian Data Owner 1
Secure Protocol 
Secure Protocol 
Figure 4: partial data distribution
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distribution. Each party holds specific features of the data and they have the same
number of records and each row in their dataset represent the same record in all
parties with different features. As an example, we imagine the whole dataset is the
data custodian’s dataset in Figure 3. There are two parties. The first party, holds
only the first feature (e.g. Age) and the identifier’s column and the second party
holds the second feature (e.g. Bill Amount) and the identifier’s column of the data
custodian’s dataset. This data is distributed vertically which means that the whole
dataset is a union of all vertically partitioned datasets. In this thesis, this type of
data distribution is not covered and has not been implemented in the final web based
framework. The reader is encouraged to look into some of the works that have been
done on vertically partitioned data such as various works by Vaidya and Clifton or
Samet and Miri. Some of Clifton and Vaidya works include privacy-preserving associ-
ation rule mining [59], privacy-preserving k-means clustering [60], privacy-preserving
naive Bayes classifier [61] and privacy-preserving decision trees [62] over vertically
partitioned data. Some of Samet and Miri works include k-means clustering over
vertically and horizontally partitioned data [55] and secure comparison protocol in
the same paper, privacy-preserving back-propagation and extreme learning machine
algorithms over horizontally and vertically partitioned data [54] and two secure pro-
tocols for perceptron learning algorithm in neural networks [52] over horizontally and
vertically partitioned data.
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4.2 Secure Building Blocks
For achieving secure computation, we use Paillier [46] cryptosystem, which is an
additive homomorphic encryption system. Paillier cryptosystems does not support
multiplicative homomorphism, thus the secure multiplication method proposed by
Samet and Miri [53] is used for secure computation. Suppose two parties P1, P2 want
to perform secure multiplication with their own private data (xP1 and xP2 respec-
tively). P1 establishes a Paillier cryptosystem and shares her public key with P2. P1
encrypts her own private data and sends it to P2.
P1 : E(xP1)→ P2 (4.1)
P2 generates a random private output yP2 , encrypts the negative of yP2 (−yP2), and
multiplies it to the encrypted data sent by P1 to the power of her own private data
xP2 and sends the result to P1.
P2 : E(xP1)
xP2 ∗ E(−yP2)→ P1 (4.2)
P1 decrypts the value given by P2, and sets it as her own private output yP1 . It can
be easily shown that:
xP1 ∗ xP2 = yP1 + yP2 (4.3)
Now, suppose the two parties want to perform a secure addition with their own private
data. P1 establishes a Paillier cryptosystem, and shares her public key with P2. P1
encrypts her own private data, and sends it to P2.
P1 : E(xP1)→ P2 (4.4)
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P2 generates a random private output yP2 , and multiplies the encrypted data sent by
P1 to the encrypted value of her own private input and calculate the result to the
power of modular inverse of yP2 (y
−1
P2
) and sends the result to P1.
P2 : (E(xP1) ∗ E(xP2))y
−1
P2 → P1 (4.5)
P1 decrypts the value given by P2, and sets it as her own private output yP1 . It can
be easily shown that:
xP1 + xP2 = yP1 ∗ yP2 (4.6)
Now, suppose the two parties want to perform a secure dot product [28] with their
own private data (we assume that both parties want to perform secure dot product
on their k number of records). P1 establishes a Paillier cryptosystem, and shares her
public key with P2. P1 encrypts all k records, and sends it to P2.
P1 : E(x1), E(x2), · · · , E(xk)→ P2 (4.7)
P2 calculates the given encrypted record to the power of her own corresponding record
for each set of data and calculates the multiplication of all calculated records.
P2 : S =
k∏
i=1
E(xi)
yi (4.8)
Afterwards, P2 generates a random private output yP2 , and multiplies S to modular
inverse of yP2 and sends the result to P1.
P2 : S ∗ y−1P2 → P1 (4.9)
P1 decrypts the value given by P2, and sets it as her own private output yP1 . It can
be easily shown that:
k∏
i=1
xiyi = yP1 + yP2 (4.10)
30
As shown below, we can extend secure multiplication for multiple parties when there
are more than two parties involved.
We assume we have x1 ∗ x2 = y1 + y2. Thus:
x1 ∗ x2 ∗ x3 = (y1 + y2) ∗ x3 = y1x3 + y2x3, (4.11)
We perform two secure two-party multiplications for y1x3 and y2x3.
y1 ∗ x3 = z1 + z31, y2 ∗ x3 = z2 + z32 => (4.12)
x1 ∗ x2 ∗ x3 = z1 + z31 + z2 + z32 = z1 + z2 + z3 (4.13)
We assume x1 ∗ x2 ∗ · · · ∗ xi = y1 + y2 + · · ·+ yi.
For (i+ 1):
x1 ∗ x2 ∗ · · · ∗ xi ∗ xi+1 = (y1 + y2 + · · ·+ yi) ∗ xi+1
= y1xi+1 + y2xi+1 + · · ·+ yixi+1, (4.14)
We perform i secure two-party multiplications, so we have:
x1 ∗ x2 ∗ · · · ∗ xi ∗ xi+1 = z1 + z(i+1)1 + z2 + z(i+1)2 + · · ·+ zi + z(i+1)i
= z1 + z2 + · · ·+ zi + z(i+1) (4.15)
With a similar approach, we can extend the secure addition protocol for more than
two parties.
Now that we have our secure building blocks, we will show the protocols for pop-
ular statistical analysis methods. We assume that data user wants to perform any
statistical method between two parties for partial data distribution and subset data
distribution. As shown above, we can easily extend the methods to work on any
multi-party network.
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4.3 Statistical Analysis Methods
In this section, we will discuss the secure protocols for the computation of various
statistical analysis methods. As shown in Figure 5, the data user receives metadata
about data owners’ records. Then, she sends her preferred query to the data owners.
Data owners will perform required secure operations based on the query and each
of them will send the private output to the data user. By receiving those partial
information, the data user will be able to calculate the final result based on the given
data. Although, the mentioned process would be similar for both distribution types,
protocols for secure statistical analysis methods may differ. In this thesis, we will
discuss secure mean protocol as an example and the reader is referred to [51] for
further secure statistical methods analysis. In secure mean protocol, the data user
receives the metadata from data owners and sends the name of the attribute (e.g.
Age), which she wants to perform the secure mean protocol on to the first data owner
D1. Note that Age = (a1, a2, · · · , an) = (a1,1, a1,2, · · · , a1,n1 , a2,1, a2,2, · · · , a2,n2), such
that ai,ni ∈ Di and n = n1 + n2.
µ =
n∑
i=1
ai
n
=
n1∑
i=1
a1,i +
n2∑
i=1
a2,i
n1 + n2
(4.16)
After sending the query to the data owners, the process differs for subset or partial
data distributions. For subset data distribution, D1 establishes the encryption keys,
and sends the public keys to the second data owner D2. Then, D1 and D2 locally
calculate the summation of the corresponding column’s values such that:
Ai =
ni∑
j=1
ai,j (4.17)
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Figure 5: Orocess Flow of the Protocol
Afterwards, data owners perform a secure addition for their private values A1 and
A2. Thus, each data owner has their own private output for the summation of their
values PO1D1 and PO1D2 where:
A1 + A2 = PO1D1 ∗ PO1D2 (4.18)
Each data owner has a number of records, n1 and n2 respectively. They perform secure
summation for their records, and as a result they will have another private output
PO2D1 and PO2D2 where n1+n2 = PO2D1 ∗PO2D2 . Each data owner will send their
private outputs to the data user. Data user will then compute the multiplication of
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the given data for each set of outputs (PO1D1 ∗ PO1D2 and PO2D1 ∗ PO2D2). By
doing so, data user has the summation of all values of the requested column and also
the summation of the records. By dividing these two values, the data user has the
final result such that:
µ =
PO1D1 ∗ PO1D2
PO2D1 ∗ PO2D2
(4.19)
For partial data distribution, there is no need for the parties to perform secure sum-
mation for their number of records, i.e. they have the same number of records
(n1 = n2 = n). Thus, one of the parties sends the number of records to the data
user. The data user will multiply the given private outputs, and divide it by number
of records in order to get the final value of mean, such that:
µ =
PO1D1 ∗ PO1D2
n
(4.20)
Other protocols include Secure Variance, Secure Skewness, Secure Correlation, and
Secure Chi-Square Test, which are proposed by Samet et al. [51]. In this thesis,
we implemented all these protocols in a web-based common framework and also we
extended the work by implementing more secure statistical methods such as student’s
t-test, linear regression and logistic regression for both data distribution types. The
proposed secure protocols for student’s t-test and linear regression for subset data
distribution and partial data distribution are completely original and also a new
approach has been proposed for secure logistic regression for partial data distribution.
4.3.1 Secure Student t-test
The t-test determines whether two sets of data are statistically different from each
other. To be able to use t-test for secure computation, the algorithm should be broken
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for two-party computation. The t-test formula is as below:
t =
µA − µB√
varA/nA + varB/nB
(4.21)
where A and B are 2 sets of data, µA and µB are mean values of data sets A and B
respectively, varA and varB are variance values of data sets A and B respectively and
nA and nB are the number of records of data sets A and B respectively. Thus, for
performing secure t-test protocol, two secure mean operations, two secure variance
operations and two secure count operations are needed for each one of the two sets of
data. The process is similar for partial data distribution and subset data distribution.
Note that the secure mean and secure variance protocols are different for partial
and subset data distribution. For calculating the mean and variance in partial data
distribution, there is no need for secure addition for computing the number of records,
because each party holds the same number of records as the original data owner. The
only difference is, both parties have portion of all values and and each value can be
computed by adding partial values.
4.3.2 Secure Linear Regression
Simple linear regression determines the relationship between two sets of data and is
used for assessing the association between two variables. Like other secure protocols,
the linear regression formula should be broken for two-party computation. Simple
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linear regression formula is as below:
y = a+ bx (4.22)
b =
NΣXY − (ΣX)(ΣY )
NΣX2 − (ΣX)2 (4.23)
a =
ΣY − bΣX
N
(4.24)
where x and y are the variables, b is the slope of the regression line, a is the intercept
point of the regression line and the y axis, N is the number of records, X is the first
variable and Y is the second variable.
For subset data distribution we know that:
N = n1 + n2 (4.25)
where n1 is the number of records of the first party and n2 is the number of records
of the second party. Thus,
N∑
i=1
Xi =
n1∑
i=1
x1i +
n2∑
i=1
x2i (4.26)
N∑
i=1
Yi =
n1∑
i=1
y1i +
n2∑
i=1
y2i (4.27)
N∑
i=1
XiYi =
n1∑
i=1
x1iy1i +
n2∑
i=1
x2iy2i (4.28)
N∑
i=1
X2i =
n1∑
i=1
x21i +
n2∑
i=1
x22i (4.29)
where Xi is the i -th record of first variable, Yi is the i -th record of second variable, x1i
is the i -th record of first variable of first party, x2i is the i -th record of first variable
of second party, y1i is the i -th record of second variable of first party and y2i is the
i -th record of second variable of second party. Thus for calculating the slope of the
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regression line (b), five secure additions are needed (N,ΣX,ΣY,ΣXY,ΣX2).
For partial data distribution, the protocol is completely different. We know that in
partial data distribution, each party has the same number of records as the original
data and:
Xi = vi + ui (4.30)
Yi = wi + zi (4.31)
where vi is the i -th record of first variable of first party and ui is the i -th record of
first variable of second party and the summation of corresponding values form the
original data. It is quite similar for Yi. Thus,
N∑
1
Xi =
N∑
1
(vi + ui) =
N∑
1
vi +
N∑
1
ui (4.32)
N∑
1
Yi =
N∑
1
(wi + zi) =
N∑
1
wi +
N∑
1
zi (4.33)
N∑
1
XiYi =
N∑
1
(vi + ui)(wi + zi)
=
N∑
1
viwi + vizi + uiwi + uizi
=
N∑
1
viwi +
N∑
1
vizi +
N∑
1
uiwi +
N∑
1
uizi (4.34)
N∑
1
X2i =
N∑
1
(vi + ui)
2
=
N∑
1
v2i + u
2
i + 2viui
=
N∑
1
v2i +
N∑
1
u2i + 2
N∑
1
viui (4.35)
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For calculating 4.32 and 4.33, two secure additions are needed. In 4.34,
∑N
1 viwi
and
∑N
1 uizi can be computed locally, but two secure dot products are needed for
calculating
∑N
1 vizi and
∑N
1 uiwi. Thus, three additional secure additions are needed
for the computation of 4.34. In 4.35,
∑N
1 v
2
i and
∑N
1 u
2
i can be computed locally,
but one secure dot product is needed for calculating
∑N
1 viui. Thus, two additional
secure additions are needed for the computation of 4.35. For calculating
∑
X
∑
Y ,
one secure multiplication is needed. For computing NΣXY − (ΣX)(ΣY ), another
secure addition is needed. Also, for calculating NΣX2 − (ΣX)2 another additional
secure addition is needed. In total, for calculating the slope of the regression line (b)
in partial data distribution, three secure dot products, one secure multiplication and
nine secure additions are needed.
4.3.3 Secure Logistic Regression
Logistic regression is a regression model that determines the relationship between one
or more independent variable(s) with a dependent variable which is categorical. It is
used to estimate the probability of a dependent variable based on independent vari-
able(s). Like other statistical analysis methods, logistic regression should be broken in
a way that each party calculates the private output for themselves and the final result
can be calculated using private output(s) for two party computation. To estimate the
parameters that best fit the data, maximum likelihood estimation is utilized. Our
model is based on the work done by Samet [50]. We denote the number of indepen-
dent samples by M in our dataset and a random dependent variable by Z which has
only two values, 1 and 0. Based on the distinct values for independent variables, we
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have N different combinations. We denote the samples with combination i by ni.
We denote a column vector with i elements which stores the number of records for
Z where the value is 1 by yi. The probability of Z being 1 for the i -th element has
been shown by pii. The independent variables could be shown in a matrix X which
has the same number of rows as our sample dataset (M ) and K+1 columns where K
is the number of independent variables. Every element’s value of the first column of
the matrix is 1. For each independent variable, we should compute a vector β with
K+1 and an intercept. Newton-Raphson method has been used for this purpose. β
can ba computed as below:
βz = βz−1 + [XTWX]−1XT (y − µ) (4.36)
µi = nipii,
pii = P (Zi = 1|i),
where β0 is an initial approximation which can be based on the previous experiments
on a similar dataset or it can be generated randomly and W is a diagonal N ∗ N
matrix. In matrix W, all the elements except for elements on its diagonal (ei) have a
zero value, where ei can be computed as below:
ei = nipii(1− pii)
We consider a specific threshold and the above computation will iterate until the
difference between βz and βz−1 is no less than the threshold. For all iterations, the
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computation of µi and wi,i is as below:
µi =
eXi∗Bz
1 + eXi∗Bz
(4.37)
wi,i =
eXi∗Bz
(1 + eXi∗Bz)2
(4.38)
The X, W and µ matrices are as below:
X =

1 x11 x12 . . . x1K
1 x21 x22 . . . x2K
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 xN1 xN2 . . . xNK

W =

n1pi1(1− pi1) 0 0 . . . 0
0 n2pi2(1− pi2) 0 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 . . . nNpiN(1− piN)

µ =

n1pi1
n2pi2
. . . . . .
nNpiN

For subset data distribution, each party has a subset of the whole data. We assume
that the first party has j1 number of records and the second party has j2 number of
records. Thus:
j1 + j2 = N => j2 = N − j1
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The first party’s X and µ matrices are as below:
X1 =

1 x11 x12 . . . x1K
1 x21 x22 . . . x2K
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 xj11 xj12 . . . xj1K

µ1 =

n1pi1
n2pi2
. . . . . .
nj1pij1

The second party’s matrices are as below:
X2 =

1 x(j1+1)1 x(j1+1)2 . . . x(j1+1)K
1 x(j1+2)1 x(j1+2)2 . . . x(j1+2)K
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 xN1 xN2 . . . xNK

µ2 =

nj1+1pij1+1
nj1+2pij1+2
. . . . . . . . . .
nNpiN

The W matrix is public. For calculating 4.36, we proceed as follow:
X
T
W =

1 1 . . . 1 1 . . . 1
x11 x21 . . . xj11 x(j1+1)1
. . . xN1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
x1K xx2K . . . xj1K x(j1+1)K
xNK


n1pi1(1− pi1) . . . 0
0 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 . . . nNpiN (1− piN )

X
T
W =

n1pi1(1− pi1) n2pi2(1− pi2) . . . nNpiN (1− piN )
x11n1pi1(1− pi1) x21n2pi2(1− pi2) . . . xN1nNpiN (1− piN )
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
x1Kn1pi1(1− pi1) x2Kn1pi1(1− pi1) . . . xNKnNpiN (1− piN )

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X
T
WX =

n1pi1(1− pi1) . . . nNpiN (1− piN )
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
xj11nj1pij1 (1− pij1 ) . . . xN1nNpiN (1− piN )
x(j1+1)1
nj1+1pij1+1(1− pij1+1) . . . xN1nNpiN (1− piN )
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
x1Kn1pi1(1− pi1) . . . xNKnNpiN (1− piN )


1 . . . x1K
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 . . . xj1K
1 . . . x(j1+1)K
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 . . . xNK

=

n1pi1(1− pi1) + · · · + nNpiN (1− piN ) . . . n1pi1(1− pi1)x1K + · · · + nNpiN (1− piN )xNK
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
xj11nj1pij1 (1− pij1 ) + · · · + xN1nNpiN (1− piN ) . . . xj11nj1pij1 (1− pij1 )x1K + · · · + xN1nNpiN (1− piN )xNK
x(j1+1)1
nj1+1pij1+1(1− pij1+1) + · · · + xN1nNpiN (1− piN ) . . . x(j1+1)1nj1+1pij1+1(1− pij1+1)x1K + · · · + xN1nNpiN (1− piN )xNK
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
x1Kn1pi1(1− pi1) + · · · + xNKnNpiN (1− piN ) . . . x1Kn1pi1(1− pi1)x1K + · · · + xNKnNpiN (1− piN )x1KxNK

The first j1 summation in each cell can be done by the first party and the second party
can calculate the rest. Thus, the above matrix can be broken into the summation of
two matrices which can be calculated by each party separately, such that:
XTWX = M1 +M2 (4.39)
where M1 and M2 are the corresponding matrices of the first party and second party
respectively. In order to fully compute 4.36, we should be able to securely compute
the inverse of a matrix. For computing the inverse of a matrix, we use a method
proposed by Han et al. [31] in which two parties can compute their private shares as
below:
[M1 +M2]
−1 = V1 + V2 (4.40)
Thus, to calculate [XTWX]−1, one secure matrix inverse computation is needed. For
calculating XT (y − µ), two secure matrix multiplications (XTy and XTµ) and one
secure addition (XTy−XTµ) are needed. Secure multiplication of matrices for partial
data distribution has been shown in [50] such that:
P ∗Q = R1 +R2 (4.41)
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Where P and Q are the two matrices of the first party and the second party respec-
tively. Thus, we have:
XTy −XTµ = W1 +W2 (4.42)
[XTWX]−1 = V1 + V2 (4.43)
=> [XTWX]−1XT (y − µ) = (V1 + V2)(W1 +W2) = V1W1 + V1W2 + V2W1 + V2W2
(4.44)
V1W1 and V2W2 can be computed locally by the first party and the second party
respectively. Moreover, V1W2 and V2W1 can be computed using secure matrix mul-
tiplication. For more in-depth details, reader is encouraged to read the original pa-
per [50].
For partial data distribution, each party has N rows of records, but the original value
can be formed by the summation of all broken values as mentioned before. In order
to fully compute 4.36, we should be able to securely compute the inverse of a ma-
trix. Thus, to calculate [XTWX]−1 in partial data distribution, two secure matrix
multiplications and one secure matrix inverse computation is needed. For calculating
XT (y−µ), two secure matrix multiplications (XTy and XTµ) and one secure addition
(XTy −XTµ) are needed.
4.4 Complexity Assumptions
As mentioned before, the proposed secure computation framework is based on Paillier
Cryptosystem [46]. The security relies on the security of discrete logarithms which
are known to be hard to solve. There is no efficient algorithm to solve the worst case
scenario for discrete logarithm problems and it can be shown that the average case’s
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complexity is quite the same as the worst case scenario. With major improvement
and usage of cloud computing and powerful computer systems, 2048-bit key is rec-
ommended for using in cryptosystems.
4.4.1 Building Blocks Complexity
Complexity analysis of all secure building blocks have been shown below. We assume
that the Paillier cryptosystem has been established by one of the data owners. The
public key exchange stage between parties through authority server has not been
considered in the communication cost, because it will only be executed once for every
protocol. The calculation of computation costs for various building blocks are based
on previous works, but the calculation of communication costs is done by the author
because the communication costs are dependent on the proposed system.
4.4.1.1 Secure Multiplication
There are two encryptions and one decryption in two-party secure multiplication. By
assuming that the cost of encryption and decryption are equal, we have:
Computation cost = 3a
where a is the cost of encryption and decryption.
Data owners are not connected together directly in the proposed system; however,
they are able to exchange data through authority server. For two-party secure mul-
tiplication, four message are exchanged between data owners and authority server.
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Thus:
Communication cost = 4b
where b is the number of bits exchanged for each message.
To improve the performance of multi-party secure multiplicationof n data owners,
data owners could be divided into two groups, i.e. P1, P2, · · · , Pbn
2
c and Pbn
2
c+1, · · · , Pn
are considered the first group and the second group. By recursively dividing the new
groups each time until all groups are a pair of two parties, the overall time would
improve significantly. So, by doing above, there are n(n+1)
2
encryptions and n(n−1)
2
decryptions for this building block. Thus:
Computation cost = (
n(n+ 1)
2
+
n(n− 1)
2
)a = n2a
We saw that in the two-party secure multiplication the cost is 4b. By denoting this
cost for n parties as C(n) where n ≥ 3, we have:
Communication cost = C(n) = C(bn
2
c) + C(dn
2
e) + (bn
2
c ∗ (dn
2
e+ 1))b (4.45)
4.4.1.2 Secure Addition
There are two encryptions and one decryption in two-party secure multiplication. By
assuming that the cost of encryption and decryption are equal, we have:
Computation cost = 3a
where a is the cost of encryption and decryption.
For two-party secure addition, four messages are exchanged between data owners and
authority server. Thus:
Communication cost = 4b
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where b is the number of bits exchanged for each message.
There are (n−1)(n+2)
2
encryptions and n(n−1)
2
decryptions for n party secure addition.
Thus:
Computation cost = (
(n− 1)(n+ 2)
2
+
n(n− 1)
2
)a = (n− 1)(n+ 1)a
All messages are sent from data owners to authority server and then from authority
server to other data owners. Therefore,
Communication cost = (n− 1)(n+ 2)b (4.46)
4.4.1.3 Secure Dot Product
If the secure dot product performed on k records, there are k+1 encryptions and one
decryption in two-party secure dot product. By assuming that the cost of encryption
and decryption are equal, we have:
Computation cost = (k + 2)a
where a is the cost of encryption and decryption.
For two-party secure dot product, four messages are exchanged between data owners
and authority server. Thus:
Communication cost = 4b
where b is the number of bits exchanged for each message.
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4.4.2 Secure Statistical Analysis Methods Complexity
Complexity analysis of all secure protocols are shown below. We assume that the
Paillier cryptosystem has been established by one of the data owners. As mentioned
before, the complexity analysis for secure student t-test and linear regression for both
data distribution types and the complexity analysis for secure logistic regression for
partial data distribution are proposed by the author. We show the costs of all proto-
cols using the calculated costs of secure building blocks as follow:
Secure multi-party multiplication computation cost : SMMC(n)
Secure multi-party multiplication communication cost : SMMM(n)
Secure multi-party addition computation cost : SMAC(n)
Secure multi-party addition communication cost : SMAM(n)
Secure multi-party dot product computation cost : SMDC(n)
Secure multi-party dot product communication cost : SMDM(n)
4.4.2.1 Secure Mean
For subset data distribution, there are two secure additions needed to perform secure
mean protocol, thus:
Computation cost = 2SMAC(n)
Communication cost = 2SMAM(n)
47
For partial data distribution, there is only one secure addition needed to perform
secure mean protocol, thus:
Computation cost = SMAC(n)
Communication cost = SMAM(n)
4.4.2.2 Secure Variance
For subset data distribution, there are two secure additions needed and one secure
mean (two additional secure additions) to perform secure variance protocol, thus:
Computation cost = 4SMAC(n)
Communication cost = 4SMAM(n)
For partial data distribution, there are five secure additions needed to perform secure
variance protocol, thus:
Computation cost = 5SMAC(n)
Communication cost = 5SMAM(n)
4.4.2.3 Secure Skewness
For subset data distribution, there are two secure additions needed and one secure
variance (two additional secure additions), as well as one secure mean (two additional
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secure additions) to perform secure skewness protocol, thus:
Computation cost = 6SMAC(n)
Communication cost = 6SMAM(n)
For partial data distribution, there are five secure additions needed to perform secure
skewness protocol, thus:
Computation cost = 5SMAC(n)
Communication cost = 5SMAM(n)
4.4.2.4 Secure Correlation
For subset data distribution, there are two secure additions needed and two secure
variances (four additional secure additions), two secure means (four additional secure
additions) to perform secure correlation protocol, thus:
Computation cost = 10SMAC(n)
Communication cost = 10SMAM(n)
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For partial data distribution, there are nine secure additions needed to perform secure
correlation protocol, thus:
Computation cost = 9SMAC(n)
Communication cost = 9SMAM(n)
4.4.2.5 Secure Student’s t-test
For subset data distribution, there are two secure additions needed and two secure
variances (four additional secure additions), two secure means (four additional secure
additions) to perform secure Student’s t-test protocol, thus:
Computation cost = 10SMAC(n)
Communication cost = 10SMAM(n)
For partial data distribution, there are nine secure additions needed to perform secure
student’s t-test protocol, thus:
Computation cost = 9SMAC(n)
Communication cost = 9SMAM(n)
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4.4.2.6 Secure Linear Regression
For subset data distribution, there are five secure additions needed to perform secure
linear regression protocol, thus:
Computation cost = 5SMAC(n)
Communication cost = 5SMAM(n)
As mentioned before, for partial data distribution, there are five secure additions and
three secure dot products needed to perform secure linear regression protocol, thus:
Computation cost = 9SMAC(n) + 3SMDC(n) + SMMC
Communication cost = 9SMAM(n) + 3SMDM(n) + SMMM
4.4.2.7 Secure Logistic Regression
We denote the computation cost of secure matrix multiplication and secure matrix
inversion by SMTC and SMIC respectively. Also, we denote the communication cost
of secure matrix multiplication and secure matrix inversion by SMTM and SMIM
respectively. For partial data distribution, we have two secure matrix multiplications
and one secure matrix inversion, thus:
Computation cost = 2SMTC(n) + SMIC(n)
Communication cost = 2SMTM(n) + SMIM(n)
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For partial data distribution, we have six secure matrix multiplications and one secure
matrix inversion, thus:
Computation cost = 6SMTC(n) + SMIC(n)
Communication cost = 6SMTM(n) + SMIM(n)
4.5 Statistical Analysis Methods in Healthcare
Statistical analysis methods have various usage in healthcare. In this section, we
present various example uses of statistical analysis methods used in healthcare stud-
ies. For example, for getting average age of patients who have chronic disease between
2002 and 2006 in Newfoundland, the statistical mean can be used. For getting the
number of specific kind of patients (i.e. those who suffer from diabetes) in a certain
city or district, a count method can be used. For explaining variation between ac-
tual costs and planned costs in healthcare organizations, the variance method can be
used [19]. In most healthcare organizations, skewed data is an issue in order to calcu-
late the costs. For overcoming this issue, skewness method can be used for calculating
costs in healthcare [39]. Analyzing the distribution of risk-factor-attributable disease
burden is an important factor to decrease the costs for a healthcare organizations and
skewness is one of the most important statistical analysis methods for this purpose
which was used in [49]. For understanding a lot more about the relationship between
daily hassles, uplifts and major life events to health status, correlation analysis can
be used [16]. Student’s t-test has been used for describing the attitude of medical
students towards patient-centered care considering individual preferences and param-
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eters [30]. Diabetes knowledge test has two important components: a 14-item general
test and a 9-item insulin-use subscale. A diabetes knowledge test has been done on
two different populations using t-test [25]. Dr. Hancox [32] used linear regression
to examine the relationship between television viewing and health indicators such as
serum cholesterol and body-mass index. Also, in the same research, the relationship
between current smoking of patients of age 26 and television viewing has been exam-
ined using logistic regression. For assessing the risk of a new drugs in a market, data
must be gathered through various sources. To analyze the risk and reduce the risks
of the new drugs, logistic regression should be used. A secure distributed multi-party
computation protocol for logistic regression has been developed for adverse drug re-
action and surveillance [20]. For monitoring the effectiveness of HPV vaccination
various data registries are required and to link all these data from different registries,
odds ratio is needed. A secure protocol has been proposed to address this issue [21].
These are just some limited examples of wide usage of statistical analysis methods in
healthcare. For describing and examining various aspects of health and the relation-
ship between parameters in health and healthcare, statistical analysis methods are
used.
53
Chapter 5
Implementation
In this thesis, I have implemented a web-based secure multi-party computation sys-
tem using Java Servlet framework for the backend programming language, and I used
HTML, CSS and Javascript as frontend programming languages. Also, MySQL has
been used as our database management server.
Our web application has three different types of users: data user, data owner and
administrator. As shown in Figure 6, each type of user interacts with the system in
various ways.
As shown in Figure 7, the data user sends the query and the query analyzer validates
the query. If the query is not valid, the query analyzer displays an error message.
Otherwise, the query analyzer sends the query to the repositories for collecting data.
Afterwards, the collected data will be sent to the secure computation protocol, which
is the main part of the implementation. Then, the secure computation protocol re-
turns various outputs and sends them to corresponding repositories. The repositories
send the output to the data user, who will compute the final result from the given
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Figure 6: Use Case Diagram
inputs. Thus, different panels have been considered for each type of user. Data users
would be able to login to their own panel using their own credentials, which is con-
firmed by the administrator. Data users can view a list of metadata that is provided
by the data owners and can send a query to data owners through system administra-
tor. For a better user experience, a graphical query builder has been implemented,
such that users can create their own queries with zero knowledge of SQL queries. For
example, they would be able to send any query by selecting the preferred attribute
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(column) and the condition of their query from a dropdown list. Data owners would
be able to select their preferred level of security, change their data conversion con-
figurations, block unsafe queries and view their queries and records’ history. The
administrator would be able to define system parameters and security level, create
data users and data owners or approve them upon registration, manage data transfer
between data owners and data users and view the history of the system. To be able
`
Data User Query Analyzer Repositories Secure 
Computation 
System 
Send Query If(valid) send 
to reositories 
Send data for 
secure 
computation 
Send output 
to each 
repository 
Send  outputs 
to data user 
Compute result 
from given data 
If(!valid) 
display error 
Figure 7: Sequence Diagram
to find out more about the proposed methods and the expected results (which are
covered in Chapter 6), we have implemented a simple desktop version of the secure
multi-party computations mentioned in this thesis, which was originally proposed by
Samet et al. [51]. We have used Java programming language for implementation and
RMI module is used for data transfer between the parties. As shown in Figure 8,
the data user sends the attribute and desired statistical method to the data own-
ers directly and receives the result while being able to view the process flow. The
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Figure 8: Desktop Application
framework follows MVC (Model-View-Controller) [35] software architectural pattern
which is one of the most popular software design patterns. Models are Java classes to
manage the data directly and are completely independent from user interface. Views
are HTML or JSP pages for showing the representation of the data and the users will
interact with the system through these pages. Controllers are mostly JSP pages to
update both views and models and help transfer input and output between views and
models. A controller updates the view when the model changes and also updates the
model when the user interacts with the system through view.
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The web framework consists of two major dependent components: The core and the
web service. Most of the functionalities of the website such as authentication, regis-
tration, history view and query submitting lie in the core component. Also, all the
views and the user interface are handled and shown in this component. The web
service only runs on data owners’ systems. Data owners communicate with the cen-
tralized server using their web services. For example, when a query is submitted by
a researcher the query is sent to data owners through their web services and the web
service decides to invoke a certain method and returns the result for further use.
5.1 Java Classes
The implementation consists of various Java classes for managing processes in the
system.
5.1.1 Database Helper Class (DBHelper.java)
For working with the database, a Database Helper class has been implemented to
simplify the process. Every interaction with the database would go through this
class. It consists of various methods to implement the four basic database functions
(Create, Read, Update and Delete). Repositories (see Figure 7) mostly use this class
for fetching data from their local databases. Below are the methods for Database
Helper class and their usage.
insert: This method is implemented for inserting a single row into a database
table. It gets the name of the table, an array of columns’ names, an array of
values for each cell of any data type, the name of the primary column and the
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value of the primary column as an input. It will return the id of the insertion if
the insert is successful. If the new row contains a duplicate value of the primary
column of the given table, the method returns −1 which means the new row has
not been inserted because of an existing same value for the primary column. If
there is a problem with the database such as connecting to the database, the
method returns 0.
insertBatch: This method is implemented for inserting multiple rows into a
database table. It gets the name of the table, an array of columns’ names and
an array of values for each cell of any data type as an input. It will return
1 if the insert is successful. If there is a problem with the database such as
connecting to the database, the method returns 0.
update: This method is implemented for updating row(s) of a table. It gets
the name of the table, an array of columns’ names, an array of values for each
cell of any data type and a string of condition(s) as an input. It will return 1
if the update is successful. Otherwise, it will return 0 which means there is a
problem with the database such as connecting to the database or the database
server is oﬄine.
delete: This method is implemented for deleting row(s) of a table. It gets the
name of the table and a string of condition(s) as an input. It will return 1 if the
delete is successful. Otherwise, it will return 0 which means there is a problem
with the database such as connecting to the database or the database server is
oﬄine.
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select: This method is implemented for retrieving row(s) from a single table.
This is the most frequent method that is used in the implemented framework.
It gets the name of the table, an array of columns’ names and a string of
condition as an input. It returns a ResultSet Java data type which contains the
retrieving rows if the query is successful. Otherwise, it returns 0 if the query is
unsuccessful.
selectLeftJoin: This method is implemented for retrieving row(s) from a table
joined by a related table when the given table contains a column related to
another table. This method is used many times in the project and it is one of
the most frequently used kinds of queries. It gets the name of the table, an array
of columns’ names, the name of the second table, the name of the corresponding
column of the first table, the name of the corresponding column of the second
table and a string of condition as an input. It returns a ResultSet Java data
type which contains the retrieving rows if the query is successful. Otherwise, it
returns 0 if the query is unsuccessful.
customSelect: This method is implemented for retrieving row(s) from ta-
ble(s) using a custom query. Sometimes the query for retrieving row(s) from
a database is too complicated that none of the mentioned select queries could
achieve it. Thus a custom select query method is implemented for complex
select queries. It gets the query as an input. It returns a ResultSet Java data
type which contains the retrieved rows if the query is successful. Otherwise, it
returns 0 if the query is unsuccessful.
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5.1.2 Global Variables Class (Globals.java)
For storing global variables, a global variables class has been implemented. Sometimes
various Java classes need to access pre-defined static variable(s) for their usage such
as the root directory of the project.
5.1.3 System Messages Class (Message.java)
Any software system shows various messages to its users such as errors which could
be a meaningful message to the user, an error code or any non-human readable mes-
sage. For example as shown in Figure 7) would display an error message to data user
by using this class. In this implementation, a system message class has been imple-
mented for returning meaningful messages to the user which are generated by the
system. Also, this class could be useful for multilingual purposes and depending on
the language selection of the user, the corresponding message to the chosen language
can be returned. It consists of a single get method which gets a message code string
as an input and returns the corresponding meaningful message.
5.1.4 Utility Class (Utility.java)
This class contains general methods that can be used by multiple classes. Below are
the methods for Utility class and their usage.
sha256: This method is implemented for hashing a string using known sha256
cryptographic hash function. It gets a string as an input. It returns the corre-
sponding hash string if the string is not null. Otherwise, it returns null.
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convertToBigInt: This is a series of methods for converting various Java
data types such as String, int, double and timestamp(date) to BigInteger for
calculation purposes. It gets one of the mentioned data types as an input and
returns the corresponding BigInteger value.
convertBigIntTo: This is a series of methods for converting Java BigInteger
data type to their original data type and their values. It gets a BigInteger value
as an input and returns the corresponding original value.
createRandomKey: This method is implemented for generating a random
unique string mostly for performing secure protocols and returns a String which
uses Java built-in randomUUID function for generating random strings.
sqrt: This method is implemented for calculating the square root of a BigInteger
(or BigDecimal) number. It gets a BigDecimal value as an input and returns
the square root of the value.
5.1.5 Convert Class (Convert.java)
This class is used for getting all the values and their data types from a database table
and converting various Java data types to BigInteger using Utility Class convertTo-
BigInt method and store them in another database table for further calculations.
This method is used for pre-processing stage and is used when the data changes or
based on a defined schedule (i.e. every Saturday). The convert method gets the name
of the original table, name of the converted table and a list of column names (includ-
ing their data types) as an input. It reads all the data from the original table and
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converts them to BigInteger data type and stores them in the given converted table.
Repositories (see Figure 7) mostly use this class for secure computation purposes.
5.1.6 User Class (User.java)
One of the most used classes in this framework is the User class. This class provides
the necessary basic methods for users of the system from creating a new user in
the system to checking if a user has access to a single page. Users can have their
email address as their username or choose a unique name for their username. The
noUsername property defines their preference. If noUsername is true, the given email
will be considered as their username. Below are the methods for User class and their
usage.
getId: This method returns the id property of a User ’s object.
getUsername: This method returns the username property of a User ’s object.
getEmail: This method returns the email property of a User ’s object.
getType: This method returns the type property of a User ’s object which can
be a for administrator, o for data owner and r for a researcher.
getAccess: This method returns the access property of a User ’s object which
can be 16 for administrator, 8 for data owner and 4 for a researcher.
getActivate: This method returns the activate property of a User ’s object
which can be 1 if the user is activated or 0 if the user is not activated.
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getCreateDate: This method returns the createDate property of a User ’s
object which contains the date in which the user has been created.
createUser: This method is implemented for creating (registering) a new user
into the system. It gets the username, password, email, type, access code and
activate value as an input. Note that before sending the data to the database
helper class, this method hashes the password for security reasons. If the user
has been created successfully, it returns a Pair Java data type which contains
the insertion code returned by database helper class and a successful user regis-
tration code. If the username or email address exists in the database, it returns
a Pair which contains the insertion code and a user existence message code.
Otherwise, it returns a Pair which contains the insertion code and a database
error code.
updateUserById: This method is implemented for updating a specific user’s
information. It gets the id, password, type, access code and activate value of
the user as an input. Note that email and username cannot be changed in this
framework. If the user has been created successfully, it returns a Pair Java data
type which contains the update code returned by database helper class and a
successful user registration message code. Otherwise, it returns a Pair which
contains the update code and a database error code.
getUsers: This method is implemented for retrieving all users and their prop-
erties from the database. It returns an array of Users ’ object if the query is
executed successfully. Otherwise, it returns an empty array of Users object.
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getUserById: This method is implemented for retrieving a specific user and
their properties from the database. It gets the id property of the preferred
user as an input and returns a User object if the query is executed successfully.
Otherwise, it returns an empty User object.
deleteUserById: This method is implemented for deleting a specific user
from the database. It gets the id property of the preferred user as an input
and returns a Pair containing the delete code returned by database helper class
and a successful user deletion message code if the query is executed successfully.
Otherwise, it returns a Pair which contains the delete code and a database error
code.
createProfile: This method is implemented for creating a new user profile in
the system. Each user can have various attributes such as name and address and
this method will create a profile for a single user. It gets the id, first name, last
name, phone and address of the user as an input. If the profile has been created
successfully, it returns a Pair Java data type which contains the insertion code
returned by database helper class and a successful profile creation message code.
If the id of the user exists in the database, it returns a Pair which contains the
insertion code and a user existence message code. Otherwise, it returns a Pair
which contains the insertion code and a database error code.
activateUserById: This method is used for activating a single user. For
security reasons, when a new researcher or data owner has been created, their
accounts should be activated by the administrator. This method gets the id of
the user as an input and returns a Pair containing the update code returned by
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database helper class and a successful user activation message code if the query
is executed successfully. Otherwise, it returns a Pair which contains the delete
code and a database error code.
deactivateUserById: This method is used for deactivating a single user. For
security reasons, sometime a user can be deactivated by the administrator. This
method gets the id of the user as an input and returns a Pair containing the
update code returned by database helper class and a successful user deactivation
message code if the query is executed successfully. Otherwise, it returns a Pair
which contains the delete code and a database error code.
login: This method is used for logging in a single user into the system using
their username and password. It gets the username and password as an input
and after hashing the password, sends a query to the database to select the
corresponding user using database helper class. It returns a Pair which contains
a User object and a successful user login message code if the query is executed
successfully and if the user exists in the database. If the user does not exist in
the database given the username and password, it returns a Pair which contains
a null User object and an unsuccessful user login message code. If the user has
not been activated, it returns a Pair which contains a null User object and a
deactivated user message code. Otherwise, it returns a null User object and
database error code.
checkAccess: This method is for checking if a specific user has access to a
specific page. As mentioned before, each user has an access attribute which
could be 16, 8 and 4 for admin, data owner and researcher respectively. Also,
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each page has an access value which can be stored in the database or hard coded
into the page itself as a variable. In this framework, the later has been used for
its simplicity. To check if a single user has access to a specific page, a logical
conjunction operand would be operated on the user’s access attribute and the
page’s access attribute and if the result is 0, the user does not have access to
that specific page. Otherwise, user can access the specific page. For example, if
a page’s access attribute is 16, it means that only the administrator can access
the page (16&16 = 16, 16&8 = 0, 16&4 = 0). For giving access to multiple
types of users for a single page, the page access can be the summation of the
preferred user types. For example, if the page access is 20, both administrator
and researcher can access the page using the checkAccess method (20&16 =
16, 20&8 = 0, 20&4 = 4). There are three major benefits of implementing the
users’ access using the mentioned method. First, it is computationally efficient,
because it works with integers and simple logical conjunction operator. Second,
it can be easily extended for any number of user types. New user type’s access
property can be any integer of powers of 2 and pages’ accesses can be easily
modified for new user types. Finally, it can be easily used for object access in
future rather than page access. Instead of giving access to pages, every object
can have an access property and it can be easily calculated to see if a user has
access to a specific object.
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5.1.7 Paillier Class (Paillier.java)
As mentioned before, the Paillier cryptosystem has been used for performing secure
computation in the framework. Thus, some of the core functionalities and methods lie
in this class. The Paillier class would be used mainly for initializing the cryptosystem
(key generation), encrypting and decrypting a message. Repositories (see Figure 7)
mostly use this class for sending data for secure computation purposes. Below are
the methods for Paillier class and their usage.
KeyGeneration: This method is used for generating the public keys and pri-
vate keys of the system based on the given length of the key bits and the
certainty of the generated prime numberswhich is given as inputs and sets the
public keys and private keys of the corresponding object. Also, it sets a random
number that is used for encryption.
Encryption: This method is used for encrypting a message. In this system,
all the messages are converted to BigInteger Java data type, because Paillier
cryptosystem (and almost every cryptosystem) works with integer numbers.
Thus, this method gets the message as an input and returns the encrypted
message using the public keys generated in the key generation phase.
Decryption: This method is used for decrypting a message. It gets the cipher-
text (a very large integer number) as an input and returns the original message
using the private keys generated in the key generation phase.
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5.1.8 Query Analyzer Class (QueryAnalyzer.java)
When a query is sent by the researcher, the Query Analyzer class will be invoked. At
first, the query sent by the user will be analyzed to check if it is safe for processing.
Then the query will be recorded in the database for future references. After that
the query will be sent to data owners for processing using an http call to their web
services. Query Analyzer (see Figure 7) mostly uses this class for verifying queries
sent from data user and sending queries to repositories. Below are the methods for
Query Analyzer class and their usage.
checkQuery: This method is used for validating the query sent by the re-
searcher. It gets the id property of the user, the preferred statistical analysis
methods, the columns’ names and the condition of the query. It returns true if
the query is safe, otherwise it returns false.
addToHistory: This method is used for recording a query in the database for
future references. It gets the id property of the user, the preferred statistical
analysis methods, the columns’ names and the condition of the query and saves a
record in the database and returns a Pair containing the insertion code returned
by database helper class and a successful query created message code if the
query is executed successfully. Otherwise, it returns a Pair which contains the
insertion code and a database error code.
sendQueryToDataOwner: This method is used for sending a submitted
query to a single data owner. It gets the web service URL of the data owner and
the preferred parameters and sends the data using HTTP Post method and gets
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the final message from the data owner and returns a JSON object. It returns
null if the connection is lost.
5.1.9 Secure Computation Class (SecureComputation.java)
The Secure Computation class is the most important section of the implementation.
It will handle all secure operations from a simple secure addition to complex statistical
analysis methods such as logistic regression. When two (or more) data owners want
to perform a secure statistical analysis method, they call various methods from this
class. Secure Computation (see Figure 7) mostly uses this class for performing secure
operations on data. Below are the methods for Secure Computation class and their
usage.
establishPaillier: This method is used for establishing a Paillier cryptosystem
between two data owners. This method is used by the first data owner and the
data owner establishes a Paillier cryptosystem and sends the public keys to the
second data owner. This method gets a unique key for future references as an
input and returns a Java Map Object containing the public keys.
setPublicKeys: This method is used for establishing a Paillier cryptosystem
between two data owners. This method is used by the second data owner and
sets the public keys sent by the first data owner for the second data owner. This
method gets a unique key for future references as an input and Paillier public
keys (g, n, bit length).
secureAddition: This method is used for performing a secure addition. We
assume that the data sent to this method has already been encrypted. Thus,
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this method performs an operation on the data based on which data owner
calls this method. It gets the data owner’s client number (first or second data
owner), self-encrypted value and the value sent by the other data owner as the
input. If the second data owner is performing the secure addition operation, it
returns its own final output and also another output that should be decrypted
by the first data owner. If the first data owner is performing secure addition, it
returns the final output by decrypting the value sent by the second data owner.
count: This method is used for performing a secure count between two parties
and it acts as a setup phase for performing the operation. It gets the preferred
query condition as an input and calculates the the number of records in the
converted database based on the query. Then, it encrypts the the number of
records using the established cryptosystem and returns the values.
mean: This method is used for performing a secure mean between two parties
and it acts as a setup phase for performing the operation. It gets the preferred
column name and the query condition as an input and calculates the summation
of all stored values and the number of records in the converted database based
on the query. Then, it encrypts the summation and the number of records using
the established cryptosystem and returns these two values.
variance: This method is used for performing a secure variance between two
parties and it acts as a setup phase for performing the operation. It gets the
preferred column name and the query condition as an input and calculates the
summation of all stored values to the power of 2 (S ) and the number of records
in the converted database based on the query. Then, it encrypts S and the
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number of records using the established cryptosystem and returns these two
values.
skewness: This method is used for performing a secure skewness between two
parties and it acts as a setup phase for performing the operation. It gets the
preferred column name and the query condition as an input and calculates the
summation of all stored values to the power of 3 (S ) and the number of records
in the converted database based on the query. Then, it encrypts S and the
number of records using the established cryptosystem and returns these two
values.
correlation: This method is used for performing a secure correlation between
two parties and it acts as a setup phase for performing the operation. It gets
two column names and the query condition as an input and calculates the
summation of the multiplication of corresponding column values (S ) and the
number of records in the converted database based on the query. Then, it
encrypts S and the number of records using the established cryptosystem and
returns these two values.
linear: This method is used for performing a secure linear regression between
two parties and it acts as a setup phase for performing the operation. It gets
two column names and the query condition as an input and calculates the
summation of the multiplication of corresponding column values, addition of all
values of the first column, addition of all values of the second column, addition of
all squared values of the first column and the number of records in the converted
database based on the query. Then, it encrypts all the mentioned values using
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the established cryptosystem and returns these values.
logistic: This method is used for performing a secure logistic regression between
two parties and it acts as a setup phase for performing the operation. It gets
two column names and the query condition as an input and calculates the
summation matrices of the multiplication matrices of corresponding column
values (S ) and the number of records in the converted database based on the
query. Then, it encrypts S and the number of records using the established
cryptosystem and returns these two values.
5.1.10 Data Exchange
The Data Exchange class handles all the data exchange between data owners and
calculates the final result based on the given values by data owners. When two
(or more) data owners want to perform a secure statistical analysis method, they
call various methods from this class. The implemented methods for various secure
protocols are similar, thus only secure mean method is described as an example.
Mean method gets a unique key, preferred column name, the query’s condition, a list
of data owners and their web service URL and the public keys as an input. Then it
sends the operation (i.e. mean), condition and the column name to data owners (for
simplicity, we assume we have two data owners). Then it gets two sets of encrypted
values from data owners. Then it sends the encrypted summation value from the first
data owner to the second data owner. Then it requests a secure addition between
two data owners and gets two private output from data owners. It follows a similar
process for getting private values from data owners for the number of records. Then
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it multiplies the first set of private outputs for calculating the summation of all
values and also calculates the total number of records by multiplying the second set
of private outputs. By dividing these two values, the average (mean) is calculated.
The implemented web framework currently supports two data owners, but it can be
easily extended to support multi-party secure computations. Repositories and Query
Analyzer (see Figure 7) mostly use this class for exchanging data.
5.2 Controllers
As mentioned before, the controllers are a bridge between the models (Java classes)
and views. When a user logs into the system, they will be redirected to the main
page. The main page is the dashboard of the system in which every user can see their
recent activities and the corresponding menu items. Important controllers are listed
below.
5.2.1 Main Controller (index.jsp)
This controller handles which dashboard should be shown to the logged-in user based
on the user type. It also redirects non-users to the login page. Moreover, it loads the
header and footer section of the framework which contains the necessary Javascript
and CSS libraries.
5.2.2 Menu Controller (leftColumn.jsp)
Based on the type of a user (administrator, data owner or researcher), the menu
items differ. This controller gets the type of the user using getType User ’s class
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method and loads the relevant menu items to the user. For example, administrator
should have access to see the list of all users in the system and be able to activate or
deactivate a user. Thus, this controller only shows the Users List menu item only to
the administrator.
5.2.3 Login Controller (loginCheck.jsp)
This controller gets the input from the view (login.html) and calls the User’s class
login method. If the login is successful, it sets the session parameters such as userId
and userType for future use and redirects the user to the main page where they can
view their dashboard based on the user type. Otherwise it will display the error
message and redirects the user back to the login page.
5.2.4 Logout Controller (logoutC.jsp)
This controller is called when a user clicks on the logout button. It invalidates the
current session and destroys it and redirects the user to the login page.
5.2.5 Secure Computation Controller (queryC.jsp)
This controller is the most important controller of the implemented framework which
handles the data exchange between data owners for performing secure statistical anal-
ysis methods. It gets the query from the user and calls the Query Analyzer’s check-
Query and addToHistory methods. If the query is safe, it sends the query to data
owners’ web services using Query Analyzer’s sendQueryToDataOwner method and
then receives the data from various data owners and sends needed data to data owners
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for performing the preferred statistical analysis method. For example, for performing
a secure mean between two data owners, it sends a secure mean request to both data
owners’ web services and receives the encrypted value of summation and number of
records from both data owners. Then it sends a secure addition request to the sec-
ond data owner’s web service for the summation and passes the first data owner’s
encrypted data to the second data owner’s web service for calculations. After that, it
receives the second’s data owner final output and the second data owner’s encrypted
data (ouput1 ). Then it sends output1 to the first data owner for decryption and
receives the final output of the first client. It repeats this process for the number of
records and receives another set of outputs. Then it calculates the aggregated result
by dividing the multiplication of each set of outputs and sends the result to the view
for showing to the researcher.
5.3 Web Service
The web service runs on data owners’ local computers and receives the data from the
centralized server. Based on the given data, the web service decides to perform the
preferred operation such as establishing a Paillier cryptosystem or performing one of
the secure statistical analysis methods. It calls the corresponding method from Secure
Computation class and returns the output as a string. The result will be converted
to JSON Java Object by the centralized server.
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5.4 Views
Administrators and data users interact with the framework through the views. For
example, administrators can see the list of registered users and meta data and data
users would be able to see their query history through the views. One of the most
important section of the views are the query builder page. Data users are able to
create their own preferred query without any knowledge of SQL queries. First, they
can select their preferred statistical analysis method and the column(s) in which they
want to perform their query on. Then, they can add unlimited number of conditions
and condition blocks for creating their own queries. Between each condition block,
there exists an OR operand and conditions in each condition blocks are connected
together by an AND operand. For example, for getting the average Age of patients
from data owners in which the patients are male and have been diagnosed after 2002
or the female patients who have been diagnosed before 2007 they can proceed as
follow:
They can select Mean as preferred statistical analysis method. Then they can select
Age as their preferred field. Two condition blocks should be added for creating the
mentioned query. There should be two conditions in each condition block. The first
field in the first condition should be Sex. The second field in the first condition should
be Is Equal and the last field in the first condition should be M. The first field in the
second condition should be Diagnosis Year. The second field in the second condition
should be Is Greater and the last field in the second condition should be 2002. These
two conditions are stored in the first condition block. The second condition block
is quite similar only with a few details changed. Figure 9 shows the screenshot that
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has been taken directly from the web framework for the mentioned query. When
the submit button is clicked, the result page will be shown to the user. Also, the
submitted query will be shown as a human readable text. As shown in Figure 10
the average age of patients with the defined conditions is 60.30 in our dataset. For
another example, we assume a researcher wants to find a relation between patients’
two variables using correlation. For example, the relation between a patient’s number
of times that has been visited by an intern and a patient’s ischemic heart disease status
for patients who are older than 45 years. As shown in Figure 11, the researcher can
select the two preferred fields (Intern Visited and Ischemic Heart Disease Status)
and can add the preferred condition (Age Is Greater than 45) and select correlation
as statistical analysis method and finally click the submit button. Figure 12 shows
the result (which is -0.0114 ) for the above query in our dataset. For another
example, we assume a researcher wants to find a linear relation between patients’
two variables using linear regression. For example, the relation between a patient’s
number of times that has been visited by an intern and a patient’s age for patients
who have ischemic heart disease. As shown in Figure 13, the researcher can select
the two preferred fields (Intern Visited and Age) and can add the preferred condition
(Ischemic Heart Disease Status equals to 1 ) and select linear regression as statistical
analysis method and finally clicks the submit button. Figure 14 shows the result
(which is y = 58.93 + 0.01x) for the above query in our dataset.
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Figure 9: Mean Query Page
79
Figure 10: Mean Query Result
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Figure 11: Correlation Query Page
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Figure 12: Correlation Query Result
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Figure 13: Linear Regression Query Page
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Figure 14: Linear Regression Query Result
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Chapter 6
Results
As mentioned in Chapter 5, implementation of a simple desktop application helped
us to acquire a better knowledge of the expected results. Our dataset consists of
10,000 records of data with 109 columns. To investigate the performance of the
proposed protocols, we first convert all the data to BigInteger for calculation purposes,
as a pre-processing stage and store the converted data in another database. This
stage will only have to be executed once or when the stored data changes. Then,
we implemented the secure addition building block. The hardware and software
specifications for the experiment are as follows:
• Windows 7 Professional
• Intel Core i5-4570 3.20GHz
• 8 GB DDR3 RAM
Table 2 shows the performance of pre-processing stage for different data types and
mixed data types. By mixed data types, we mean converting all data types at the
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Data Type Time (in seconds)
Integer 2.168
Date Time 2.949
String 2.767
Double 2.889
Mixed (for 10 different columns) 36.307
Table 2: Performance Results for the Pre-processing Stage
Algorithm Time (in seconds)
Encryption 0.00014
Decryption 0.00980
Secure Addition 0.08726
Table 3: Performance Results for the Cryptosystem and Secure Addition
same time. It can be seen that converting the mixed data takes more time than other
data types. The reason is that the framework first should detect the data type for
each column and then call the corresponding method to convert the data accordingly.
Table 3 shows the performance of the encryption, decryption and secure addition.
The encryption key length in this experiment is 1024 bits. To achieve higher level
of security, the key length could be larger, e.g. 2048 bits. Increasing the size of
the key would degrade the performance of the system. The framework uses Java
built-in BigInteger and BigDecimal classes for performing mathematical operations
on large integer numbers. Table 4 illustrates the overall time for each protocol when
the number of records is 10,000 (fetching the data from database is also included
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Algorithm Time (in seconds)
Count 0.284
Mean 0.468
Variance 0.613
Correlation 1.366
Chi-square 0.748
Skewness 0.956
Table 4: Performance Results for the Protocols Including Fetching Data from
Database
in the calculated time). Table 5 illustrates the overall time for each protocol when
the number of records is 10,000 if the data is stored in memory. By doing above
experiments, we found out that the proposed system was practical and could be fully
implemented as a web-based application and the web framework could be compared
with the desktop application. The final web-based framework has been implemented
using TCP protocol in order to work through different networks, which is faster than
Algorithm Time (in seconds)
Count 0.067
Mean 0.191
Variance 0.327
Correlation 0.854
Skewness 0.575
Table 5: Performance Results for the Protocols when Data is Stored in Memory
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RMI protocol. Thus, we expect improvement in performance.
6.1 Performance Analysis
In this section, we want to analyze the performance of the proposed protocols, build-
ing blocks and other processes (i.e. establishing the cryptosystem). The encryption
and decryption in the web application are not different than those in the desktop
application, because they both use the same resources of the system and these two
processes are independent from exchange protocol. But the key exchange process is
different, because the key is transferred through TCP protocol and RMI protocol for
web and desktop application respectively. Establishing Paillier Cryptosystem and ex-
changing data between two data owners took 38 milliseconds. To find out more about
the performance of the secure protocols, we have to consider a couple of parameters
such as the complexity of the query and number of records. Four different scenarios
have been considered for showing the performance of all protocols:
• Table 6 shows the performance of the protocols when no conditions have been
added to the query with 10000 records.
• Table 7 shows the performance of the protocols when no conditions have been
added to the query with 100000 records.
• Table 8 shows the performance of the protocols when there exists a complex
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Algorithm Time (in seconds)
Count 0.035
Mean 0.049
Variance 0.095
Skewness 0.163
Correlation 0.237
Student’s t-test 0.196
Linear Regression 0.079
Logistic Regression 0.823
Table 6: Secure Protocols Performances with no conditions and 10000 records
Algorithm Time (in seconds)
Count 2.019
Mean 2.196
Variance 4.283
Skewness 6.679
Correlation 11.513
Student’s t-test 12.388
Linear Regression 2.396
Logistic Regression 38.207
Table 7: Secure Protocols Performances with no conditions and 100000 records
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Algorithm Time (in seconds)
Count 0.033
Mean 0.046
Variance 0.091
Skewness 0.153
Correlation 0.246
Student’s t-test 0.217
Linear Regression 0.072
Logistic Regression 0.910
Table 8: Secure Protocols Performances with conditions and 10000 records
condition with 10000 records. The where condition is as below for all protocols:
Condition: Where (Age > 30 AND Diagnosis Y ear < 2007) OR (SEX = ”M”)
• Table shows the performance of the protocols when there exists a complex con-
dition with 100000 records. The where condition is as below for all protocols:
Condition: Where (Age > 30 AND Diagnosis Y ear < 2007) OR (SEX = ”M”)
All the tests have been operated on Subset Distrubted Data and only two parties have
been involved. It can be seen from the above experiments that adding complexity to
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Algorithm Time (in seconds)
Count 2.146
Mean 2.374
Variance 4.415
Skewness 6.584
Correlation 10.993
Student’s t-test 11.030
Linear Regression 2.230
Logistic Regression 35.418
Table 9: Secure Protocols Performances with conditions and 100000 records
the query does not affect the performance. The reason is, although adding conditions
to a query make a query more complex and increases the query time, it usually reduces
the number of returned records which makes up for the performance degradation.
Moreover, increasing the number of records affects the protocols’ performances by a
larger margin. It can be seen that almost all of the protocols’ processing times are 50
times more when the number of records are multiplied by 10. The main reason for
this degradation is because of database queries. Performance of queries in MYSQL
depends highly on the number of retrieved records. Also calculation on encrypted
data takes more time when the number of encrypted records is increased.
In conclusion, it can be seen that the proposed system is completely practical and can
be used for various purposes when the data is distributed among various data owners.
All the protocols have been processed in an acceptable time on a normal computer.
Also, sample records of DEPICT database have been used for running tests to test the
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practicality of the system. Moreover, if more than two data owners exist in the system,
the performance would decrease significantly based on the complexity assumptions
which were mentioned in Chapter 4. There are many ways to improve the system
which is covered in Chapter 7 such as running the final web-based framework on
powerful servers in order to perform better on larger datasets.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we implemented a secure computation web-based framework based on
Samet et al. [51] approach for popular statistical analysis methods used in various
applications, especially in health data. Also, we proposed three more statistical anal-
ysis methods and added to the framework. In addition, various features such as
an authorized server for user access control and plenty of system parameters (e.g.
security level) have been added to the framework. Computations and secure data
communications are done by two or more data owners on the private distributed data
and only the final results will be decrypted and sent back to the data user. As a
proof of concept, the final web application was tested over the Digital Epidemiology
Chronic Disease Tool (DEPICT) database. This database includes health data from
Canadian Chronic Disease Surveillance System between 1998 and 2004 for adults who
have chronic disease in Newfoundland and Labrador.
As the future work, the web application could be extended to cover other important
statistical methods in health research and other fields of science. Also, the perfor-
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mance and efficiency of the final web application could be improved in various ways,
such as implementing the application in multi-thread context.Also, the framework
could be extended to support secure computation over vertically partitioned data for
all implemented secure statistical analysis methods. Moreover, the web application
could be implemented in a way that it could be easily integrated with one or more
statistical analysis software programs, such as R and SAS.
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Appendix A
UML Diagrams
Use case diagrams, database scheme and the class diagram of the secure computation
framework have been shown below.
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UseCase Registration
Context
A new user requests to authority server for registering into secure computation 
framework
Scope Secure Computation Framework Authority Server
Actor Researcher, Data Owner, Administrator
Preconditions The user must be a new user and should be a researcher or a data owner
Trigger User clicks on the register button or administrator clicks on a create new user button
Successful
 Sequence
Scenario 1: User registraion by the user:
User must complete registration form and the system prompts for information such as 
name, email address, password and etc.
User enters correct information
User clicks submit button
System verifies the information and creates unactivated account
Administrator manually verifies the user and activates the account 
Use case ends
Scenario 2: User registration by the administrator
Administrator must complete registration form and the system prompts for information 
such as name, email address, password and etc.
Administrator enters correct information
Administrator clicks submit button
System verifies the information and creates activated account
Use case ends
Failed 
Sequence
Administrator or user cancels registration
Administrator or user does not enter correct information (e.g. incorrect email address 
format)
Administrator manually checks the user and disables the account
Figure 15: registration use case diagram
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UseCase Login
Context Users log in to the system using their email and password
Scope Secure Computation Framework Authority Server
Actor Researcher, Administrator
Preconditions
The user must be an activated registered user and should be a researcher or an 
administrator
Trigger User clicks on the login button after entering their email and password
Successful
 Sequence
The system prompts for email and password
User enters correct information
User clicks login button
System verifies the entered email and password and creates required variables such as 
session and cookie and the user will be signed in and will be redirected to their 
corresponding dashboard
Use case ends
Failed 
Sequence
User enters incorrect email and/or password  and the systems describes the reason
User is not activated and the systems describes the reason
Figure 16: login use case diagram
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UseCase Key Generation
Context Data owner establishes a Paillier cryptosystem for secure computation protocols
Scope Data Owner Web Services
Actor Data Owner
Preconditions The data owner must be verified with online web service
Trigger Authority server sends a query to the data owner
Successful
 Sequence
Authority server sends a query and a unique id to a data owner
Data owner stores the unique id and generates the private key and public keys
Data owner sends the public keys to the authority server
Use case ends
Failed 
Sequence
Query submitted by the authority server is invalid
Data owner might not be able to connect to authority server because of various issues 
such as authority server is shut down
Data owner does not receive an id
Figure 17: key generation use case diagram
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UseCase Query Submission
Context Researcher sends a preferred query to the system to get an aggregated result
Scope Secure Computation Framework Authority Server, Data Owner Web Services
Actor Researcher
Preconditions The user must be an activated registered user and should be a researcher
Trigger
Researcher clicks on the submit button on the create query page after entering and 
selecting required parameters such as statistical analysis methods, fields and conditions.
Successful
 Sequence
Researcher clicks on Submit Query on the left menu
Researcher selects preferred statistical analysis method
Researcher selects preferred column(s)
Researcher adds as many conditions and/or condition blocks as needed and enters or 
selects required parameters
User clicks submit button
Authority server verifies the query and sends it to data owners
First data owner establishes a Paillier cryptosystem and sends public keys to authority 
server
Authority server distributes public keys through all data owners
Data owners encrypt their own private inputs and send them to authority server
Authority server exchanges encrypted data between data owners
Data owners provide private output(s) and send it to authority server
Authority server computes the aggregated result
The result will be shown to the researcher
Use case ends
Failed 
Sequence
Researcher does not select required fields or enters incorrect information in the 
condition fields
Authority server does not verify the submitted query and the system prints out the 
reason
Data owners' web services are not available and the system prints out the reason
Figure 18: query submission use case diagram
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Figure 19: secure computation database scheme
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Figure 20: secure computation class diagram
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